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LABOR UNIONS-CLOSED SHOP AND ARBITRARILY CLOSED OR PARTIALLY
CLOSED UNION-INJUNCTION-The defendants appealed from an order of
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the lower court awarding a preliminary injunction which restrained the defendants from discharging or causing the discharge of the plaintiff and other
Negro employees because they were not members of a labor union with which
their employer has a closed shop agreement, but which will not grant Negroes
full membership privileges. The defendants were: the plaintiff's employer; the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of
America which is a labor union; and certain officials of the aforementioned
union. There was a written contract between the employer and the International
Brotherhood containing a provision for a closed shop. This union did not admit
Negroes to membership, but in 1937 it established separate Negro local lodges.
The defendants insisted that plaintiff and other N,egro workers must be members in good standing in these Negro locals in order to obtain work clearances
for employment in the defendant employer's shipyard. The non-Negro locals
supervised and controlled the Negro locals, allowing representation for the
Negro locals only through the business agents of the supervising locals, but the
Negro locals had no voice in the selection of these agents. The lower court
found that this, and other provisions which denied the Negroes a voice in determination of union policy and in job classifications, and which denied their
locals a permanent status clearly established a substantial discrimination against
Negro workers who accepted membership in the auxiliary locals. Held, the order
awarding the preliminary injunction is affirmed. The union may not maintain
both a closed shop and an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union membership. This is not a proper labor union objective. The holders of a monopoly,
such as the defendant union has here, over the supply of labor of this type in
this area, must not exercise their power in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner
so as to bring injury to others. lames v. Marinship Corporation, (Cal. 1944)
155 P. (2d) 329.

It is well settled that the objectives of concerted labor activity must be
proper, and the means used to attain the objective must be lawful, or the persons
injured by such activity may obtain damages or injunctive relief.1 The Marinship case then raises the question as to whether a closed union coupled with a
closed shop is a proper objective of organized labor activity, where the union
holds a monopoly of labor opportunity in the locality. Under the common law,
labor unions, like other voluntary associations, are held to have the inherent
power to exclude arbitrarily from membership whomever they wish to so exclude.2 And in California, as in many states, the legality of a closed shop agree1
Markham & Callow, Inc. v. International Woodworkers, 170 Ore. 517, 135
P. {2d) 727 (1943); Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E. (2d)
l (1943); Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. {2d) 349 (1941),
cert. den., 314 U.S. 716, 62 S.Ct. 477 (1941); 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 775,
784 et seq. (1939); 41 M1cH. L. REv. II43-n64 (1943).
2
Mayer v. Journeyman Stone-Cutters' Assoc., 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492
(1890); Greenwood v. Bldg. Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 P. 823 (1925);
Murphy v. Higgins, (N.Y. S.Ct. 1939) 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 913; in the absence of
statute, courts remain_ steadfast in refusing to compel a union to admit a qualified
applicant to membership. See Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E. (2d) 547
(1938); Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912).
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ment is recognized. 3 One can find many cases which have denied this right of
a union to maintain a closed shop and at the same time arbitrarily and unreasonably to restrict its membership. 4 There are a few states which have taken legislative action on the subject, enacting statutes restricting closed shop agreements
where there is an unreasonable refusal by the union to admit workers already
employed at the time the agreement was made. 5 Possibly legislation is the solution to the problem, many courts refusing to compel a union to admit qualified
applicants to membership even though the union has a closed shop agreement
and a practical monopoly of the labor supply in the area. Apparently these courts
feel that this problem is one for legislative determination more appropriately
than for judici~ determination. 0 This conflict between the applicant worker's
right to work and the union's right arbitrarily to restrict its membership is
steadily increasing in importance as the closed shop continues to gain judicial
and legislative favor. Some courts, even in the absence of legislation, have sought
to give. the worker relief on the ground that the union's refusal to accept his
application for membership and at the saine time seeking to maintain the closed
shop is tortious and contrary to public policy.7 Certainly, the public policy argument should have some weight here, for the union's "asserted right to choose
its own members does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to work for a living." 8 The preservation of that right seems to
be of much greater importance than the right of a union arbitrarily to restrict
its membership when that union also holds a virtual monopoly control in the
locality due to closed shop agreements.9 If the employee is a competent workman
8
McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Local Union No. 1067, l 6 Cal. ( 2d) 3 II,
106 P. (2d) 373 (1940); Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal. (2d)
379; 106,P. (2d) 403 (1940).
4
Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939), where
the court, at 102, held that "defendants' conduct, with no apparent lawful purpose,
constituted a malicious and unlawful interference with plaintiffs' employment." In
Carroll v. Local No. 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144 at 147, 31 A. (2d) 223 (1943), the
court said: " ..• although a monopoly of labor opportunity is a permissible objective
.•• of a union, unions obtaining such -monopolies must be democratic and admit to
their membership all those reasonably qualified for their trade. . . . Otherwise such
persons would be depri~ed of their constitutional right to earn a livelihood." For a good
discussion of the problem see Newman, "The Closed Union and the Right to Work,"
43 CoL. L. REV. 42 (1943).
5
New. York Civil Rights Law, N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1939) c. 6, § 43,
N.Y. Laws (1940) c. 9, § 1; Wis. Laws (1939) 57, § lII.06(1). See 53 HARV. L.
REV. 1215 (1940).
6
See 40 MrcH. L. REv. 310 (1941).
7
4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT,§ 810 (1939), says that, "Workers who,in concert
procure the dismissal of ·an employee because he is not a member of a labor union
satisfactory to the workers are . . . liable to the employee if, but only if, he desires
to be a member of the labor union but membership is not open to him on reasonable
terms." See Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919); Brown v.
Lehman, 141 Pa. Super 467, 15 A. (2d) 513, 517 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 754, 760
(1940).
8
James v. Marinship Corporation, (Cal. 1945) 155 P. (2d) 329 at 335.
9 See Newman, "The Closed Union and the Right to Work," 43 CoL. L. REv.
42 (1943); 40 MrcH. L. REv. 310 (1941).
·
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and is willing to join the union, it is difficult to see how that union can justify
its interference with his employment, unless it can prove his hostility to union
purposes.10 It would seem that in cases of this kind "the right to work" should
take precedence over the union's right to restrict its membership just as a matter
of public policy., if not as a matter of consitutional right.11
John S. Dobson

10 "If the union can force a closed shop upon all, or· almost all, of the employers
of an industry or area, the right to employment will depend upon union membership;
and if union membership be refused the workman, he is more totally excluded from
the opportunity to labor than he was before union recognition." Carroll v. Local No.
269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144 at 147, 31 A. (2d) 223 (1943). See also Dorrington v.
Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939), where it was held that evidence of a previous refusal to join the union was insufficient reason to deny membership to an applicant and to procure his dismissal from his employment.
11 Carroll v. Local No. 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A. (2d) 223 (1943).

